Catherine Kemp

Catherine Kemp

Photo here.
Associate Professor
Phone number: 
212.237.8908
Room number: 
NB 8.63.14

Education

1996 JD             The University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas
1995 PhD          State University of New York at Stony Brook
1990 MA            State University of New York at Stony Brook
1987 BA             Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana

Bio

Professor Kemp specializes in Philosophy of Law and Modern Philosophy, especially David Hume.  She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy at SUNY Stony Brook and her J.D. at the University of Texas School of Law.  She joined the John Jay community in 2010, having previously been appointed to the faculties of the University of Colorado at Denver, Penn State, and Brooklyn College.  At Brooklyn she received the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation Fellowship for Outstanding Teaching in 2010 and at the University of Colorado at Denver she won the Excellence in Teaching Award, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, in 2001.

Publications

Hume and Pragmatism (in progress).

“The False Hume in Pragmatism” The Pluralist, vol. 12, no. 3 (2017) (in press).

“Dewey’s Darwin and Darwin’s Hume.” The Pluralist, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 2017), pp. 1-26.

“The ‘Real Letter to Arbuthnot’? A Motive for Hume’s Probability Theory in an Early Modern Design Argument.”  British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 3 (2014), pp. 468-491.

“Contrariety in Hume.” New Essays on David Hume, Emilio Mazza and Emanuele Ronchetti, eds., FrancoAngeli (2007), pp. 55-64.

“Our Ideas in Experience: Hume’s Examples in ‘Of scepticism with regard to our senses.’British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 3 (2004), pp. 445-470.

Habermas and Pragmatism.  Co-editor.  Routledge (2002).

“Experience Matters: Indifference and Determination in Hume’s Treatise.Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 4 (2002), pp. 243-255.

“Law’s Inertia: Custom in Logic and Experience.” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society. JAI/Elsevier Science (2002), vol. 25, pp. 135-149.

“Two Meanings of the Term ‘Idea’: Acts and Contents in Hume’s Treatise.Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 61, no. 4 (2000), pp. 675-690.

“The Innateness Charge: Conception and Belief for Reid and Hume.” Reid Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 43-54.

“Habermas among the Americans: Some Reflections on the Common Law.” Exploring Habermas on Law and Democracy, Symposium issue, Denver University Law Review, vol. 76, no. 4 (1999), pp. 961-975.

“The Uses of Abstraction: Remarks on Interdisciplinary Efforts in Law and Philosophy.” Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and the Law, Symposium issue, Denver University Law Review, vol. 74, no. 4 (1997), pp. 877-888.

Reviews:

Frederic Kellogg, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Legal Theory, and Judicial Restraint.  Philosophical Inquiry, 32(3-4), p. 118-120 (2010).

Ryan Nichols, Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception.  Hume Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (November 2007), pp. 339-344.

Feminist Interpretations of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson.  Hypatia, vol. 20, no. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 206-209.